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CISA withheld telecom cyber warning for four years before Salt Typhoon

A June 2022 CISA report warned of “major structural vulnerabilities” before Salt Typhoon targeted nine telecom firms in 2024. CISA delayed its release for four years.

US was warned of telecom security risks years before Salt Typhoon
FeedUS was warned of telecom security risks years before Salt Typhoon — AI-generated

Event log

  1. CISA commissioned a June 2022 report that warned of major structural vulnerabilities in US telecom networks.
  2. CISA withheld the report for four years and resisted congressional pressure to publish it.
  3. Salt Typhoon targeted nine telecom companies in 2024, including Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile and Lumen.
  4. Officials alleged the campaign stole telephone audio intercepts and a large tranche of call-record data.
  5. The report surfaced through a lawsuit; Bloomberg first reported its details, and Reuters reviewed it.

CISA withheld a June 2022 telecom security report for four years, two years before Chinese-linked Salt Typhoon targeted nine telecommunications companies in 2024.

The report, commissioned by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA, the federal cyber and infrastructure protection agency), identified major national security risks created by weaknesses in US telecom networks. It warned of “major structural vulnerabilities” and said attackers could compromise the networks from anywhere in the world.

Its scope reached national infrastructure and international connectivity rather than a single carrier or operating region. The document predates the 2024 campaign by two years and supplied a pre-incident warning about US telecom networks.

What did the June 2022 report warn?

The June report warned of “major structural vulnerabilities” (systemic weaknesses across network infrastructure) and said attackers could compromise the networks from anywhere in the world. It described national telecom infrastructure as a “perilous and untenable situation.”

International interconnects (cross-border links carrying traffic between telecom operators) could provide attackers “trusted” access, according to the document. One passage said the remote-compromise condition was not yet widely understood.

The report tied the trusted-access language to international connectivity, and its central risk was remote compromise of national networks rather than a threat confined to one operator. Its findings addressed the telecom system as a whole, across carriers and borders.

What did officials say Salt Typhoon compromised?

US officials have previously alleged that Chinese-linked Salt Typhoon hackers targeted nine telecom companies during the 2024 campaign and stole telephone audio intercepts (intercepted calls) alongside a large tranche of call-record data (information about calls and callers).

The nine-company target set included:

  • Verizon
  • AT&T
  • T-Mobile
  • Lumen

Those allegations covered two forms of communications exposure: listening content and records associated with call activity. Salt Typhoon was a sweeping campaign across the sector, not an incident confined to one operator.

The account gave the number of targeted companies but no total for affected customers, intercepted calls or stolen records. The cited allegations provided no remediation cost or customer-loss figure. The volume of call records remained described only as a large tranche.

Why did CISA withhold the report?

The report was disclosed as part of a lawsuit and reviewed by Reuters. Bloomberg News first reported its details.

Bloomberg also reported that CISA withheld the document from public release for four years. The agency resisted congressional pressure to publish it. CISA did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment.

The disclosure route placed the June 2022 document itself before Reuters and the public through a lawsuit rather than through an agency release, following four years of withholding. The account leaves the agency’s rationale for withholding unstated because CISA did not answer Reuters.

The four-year period covered more than the interval between the report and the attacks. It also extended through congressional demands for release. The report’s disclosure came through litigation, not an agency publication, and CISA offered no immediate explanation.

Could earlier disclosure have changed Congress’s response?

Ron Wyden, a Democratic senator from Oregon, pushed for the report’s release last year. He said in a statement: “Congress would have had ample time to require mandatory cybersecurity standards for phone companies, in time to prevent the Salt Typhoon hacks” had the report been made public when it was first written.

Wyden framed the disclosure date as a direct security variable, placing publication, mandatory carrier standards and the prevention of the 2024 intrusions in a single sequence. That argument put responsibility for the delayed disclosure on the release decision, rather than on a lack of earlier risk information.

The document supplied the technical warning. Congress, in Wyden’s account, needed public access before it could act. CISA’s withholding kept the warning from public and congressional view during the two years between the report and the campaign.

The unresolved issue was not the existence of the warning. It was the effect of timing on standards and prevention, which Wyden presented as decisive.

via itnews.com.au (Source)

Filed under

  • cisa
  • salt-typhoon
  • telecommunications-security
  • critical-infrastructure
  • us-telecom-networks
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Senior reporter covering money, funding and market shifts around enterprise information technology and the leaders who run at CIO Monitor.

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