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Nvidia Security Team Faces Questions as CEO Exits Over Affair Reports

Nvidia CSO David Reber left in August for health reasons; ten weeks later Jensen Huang resigned. Questions mount over what security knew about Megaspeed scrutiny.

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Where was Nvidia’s security team?
FeedWhere was Nvidia’s security team? — Magnascan / pixabay

Event log

  1. David Reber left the Nvidia CSO post in late August after four years as CSO and seven at the company.
  2. Jensen Huang resigned two and a half months after Reber's departure.
  3. The New York Times cited five Nvidia employees on one relationship; Reuters cited two sources on a second.
  4. IMSI catchers cost about $1,000 for a basic suitcase-sized version, per Eftimiades.
  5. Nvidia's top lawyer engaged with the government's Megaspeed inquiry more than a year ago.

Nvidia lost its chief security officer in August, ten weeks before CEO Jensen Huang resigned over questions about extramarital relationships, and the company has not answered questions about what its security function knew. David Reber, who served four years as CSO and seven at Nvidia overall, stepped down in late August. He cited health reasons. "This wasn't a pivot I had planned. But I know what needs to come first: family and health," Reber wrote on LinkedIn, disclosing a diagnosis of young-onset Parkinson's more than two years earlier.

Who left, and who replaced him?

Reber's successor is Saša Zdjelar, who spent 17 years at ExxonMobil in Houston and left as a senior IT manager, then worked one year at Salesforce and several years at cybersecurity firm ReversingLabs. Zdjelar did not respond to questions Thursday about the transition. Reber also did not respond. Nvidia has not answered related questions. Nothing public connects either role change to the Megaspeed matter.

What does the Megaspeed connection involve?

Huang's relationships came under scrutiny starting with an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore data center company that U.S. investigators suspect of funneling Nvidia chips to China. The questions then widened to reports of two separate affairs with Nvidia employees. Megaspeed has denied any wrongdoing. Some people inside Nvidia clearly knew parts of the picture: Nvidia's top lawyer engaged with the government's Megaspeed inquiry more than a year ago, according to The New York Times. Nvidia has said it regularly contacts officials.

The Times cited five Nvidia employees who said Huang was involved with a vice president reporting directly to him. Reuters, citing two people, later reported a second relationship. Nvidia's code of conduct does not expressly forbid such behavior. What remains unclear is whether any of it reached the security team. Relationships with subordinates typically fall to human resources, legal and the board rather than security, but specialists draw a sharper line at an affair with an executive at a company under federal investigation. Security specialists say affairs can create vulnerabilities that foreign intelligence services actively seek to exploit.

Why is insider risk so hard to detect?

Intelligence services collect much of their information through everyday conversation rather than hacking, according to retired senior intelligence officer Nicholas Eftimiades, who says he has trained more than 1,000 corporate security professionals. That collection method makes risk identification especially difficult for corporate teams. Eftimiades, author of "Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics" published in 2020, said security teams are also often underfunded because they do not drive revenue. CEOs frequently answer budget warnings with "not a nickel more than compliance," he said.

Many companies define security too narrowly, specialists argue. Don Aviv, CEO of corporate investigations firm Interfor International, and author Jeremy Hurewitz wrote in The Hill: "Too many companies still approach security primarily as a matter of protecting facilities, preventing cyberattacks, and responding to physical threats." They argued that "security teams need to pay greater attention to insider threats, including the cultivation of executives and employees by foreign intelligence services, suspicious business relationships, conflicts of interest and attempts to obtain sensitive information through trusted personal contacts."

What can intelligence services actually obtain?

Speaking generally and not about Huang, Eftimiades offered a hypothetical: a CEO complains he cannot act because "I'm fighting a board who doesn't want to do this." That statement tells an intelligence asset who the obstacle is. The service then asks, "Who's the sticking point here?" and looks for ways into that person's email and phone. Rival services often want policy insight more than technology, including who is pushing to change export rules and who the biggest blocker is. "Intel world tends to be like cancer," Eftimiades said. "Once it gets into the body, it looks to spread and looks to reach out."

The playbook is not new, Eftimiades added, "particularly for China." Any executive dealing with the country "will tell you that they've been approached." He also cited "tons of diplomat stories" of U.S. diplomats entering hotel rooms to find a woman on the bed. What is newer compared with Soviet-era spying, he said, is that cultivated relationships now often last years, not weeks.

Technology can augment human intelligence collection. Eftimiades pointed to IMSI catchers (devices that mimic a cell tower so nearby phones connect to them) as one example. A basic version costs about $1,000 and fits in a suitcase, he said. Government-grade models cost far more. No one knows yet whether such tools were used against Huang, whose phone was presumably hardened so compromises could be detected if not stopped.

What happens next?

What Nvidia's security team knew, and whether it could have acted, should become clearer as the board's independent investigation and federal inquiries proceed. Eftimiades said he hopes the episode serves as "a wake-up call" for U.S. industry, which he called mostly "clueless" about China's tactics. "We have lost trillions [of dollars] in intellectual property," he said. "Whatever we think we're doing isn't working."

via techcrunch.com (Source)

Filed under

  • nvidia
  • insider-threats
  • corporate-security
  • espionage
  • china
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Senior reporter covering money, funding and market shifts around enterprise information technology and the leaders who run at CIO Monitor.

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