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One Pull Request Could Have Unlocked Microsoft's WinGet Supply Chain

Cycode found a patched zero-click WinGet flaw that could leak Microsoft moderators' full GitHub identity tokens, exposing 14,000 packages on 1.4 billion devices.

A single pull request could have handed attackers the keys to Microsoft’s software supply chain
FeedA single pull request could have handed attackers the keys to Microsoft’s software supply chain — Pexels / pixabay

Event log

  1. Zero-click flaw in WinGet moderator tooling could leak full GitHub identity tokens via a single pull request
  2. WinGet runs on more than 1.4 billion active Windows 10, 11 and Server 2025 devices
  3. A leaked token would have reached 14,000 exposed packages plus every Microsoft repo the moderator could access
  4. Microsoft patched the PowerShell tool to scope tokens to authorized GitHub endpoints only
  5. No evidence of exploitation in the wild

A single pull request was all it took. Researchers at penetration-testing firm Cycode found a now-patched critical zero-click supply chain vulnerability in Microsoft's open-source Windows Package Manager (WinGet) — a tool sitting on more than 1.4 billion active devices running Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server 2025.

The flaw, in the internal triage tool used by WinGet's official Microsoft moderators, could have tricked Microsoft's own automation into handing over a moderator's GitHub access token. No phishing. No malware. No click, no approval, no moderator involvement at all.

There's no evidence anyone exploited it in the wild. But the near miss lands as a warning for every enterprise running trusted automation against public package repositories.

"Package registries have become the highest-profile target in the software supply chain," Cycode security research lead Moriel Harush wrote in a blog post. "Compromise a single maintainer, and you reach everyone who trusts them. Compromise the gatekeepers, and you reach the entire ecosystem."

How did the attack work?

WinGet's package catalog lives in a public GitHub repository, gated by a small group of Microsoft moderators who review a constant stream of community pull requests. By default, every WinGet installation on every Windows machine trusts the actions those moderators take.

The hole sat in the moderators' own tooling. A PowerShell helper attached the moderator's secret GitHub Personal Access Token (PAT) to every outgoing HTTP request — without checking who owned the destination address.

An attacker only had to supply one. Open a pull request, point the InstallerURL field at a server they controlled, and, as Harush put it, "the trap was set." Microsoft's Azure DevOps validation pipeline would try to fetch the URL; the attacker's server deliberately returned an error, which slapped a validation-error label onto the pull request.

That label triggered the moderator's script to run its CheckInstaller routine, sending a HEAD request through the authenticated HTTP helper. The token went with it. The attacker just read their logs and picked up a Microsoft moderator's official GitHub credential.

And this wasn't a narrow, repository-scoped key. It was a full identity credential — whatever that moderator could do on GitHub, the token could do.

"It is like a courier stapling your house key to every parcel that has your name on it, because most of them are destined for your own address," Harush explained. Change the address, and "your key is delivered directly to them."

One precondition: at least one moderator had to keep the triage tracker running in its continuous background loop — which is exactly how the tool is designed to wait for work.

What did that key open?

With the token in hand, an attacker could have:

  • Pushed malicious manifests and approved their own pull requests, slipping backdoored installers into 14,000 exposed packages under an official Microsoft badge
  • Read from and written to every other Microsoft repository the moderator could access
  • Modified GitHub Actions workflows across those repositories to achieve remote code execution and exfiltrate corporate secrets

To an enterprise IT team, the damage would have looked like routine work. A scripted software rollout would have installed attacker code on every machine, and the logs would have shown an approved package from an approved source.

"The attack would have been a Trojan horse delivered by the mail carrier everyone trusts," said Frank Dickson of Dickson Research.

Is the fix enough?

Partly. Microsoft has patched the PowerShell vulnerability, scoping authentication so tokens attach only when the request host is an authorized GitHub endpoint — api.github.com, github.com, or raw.githubusercontent.com. Notably, a C# version of the same tool in the same directory never shared the flaw and would have offered safer authentication.

But Harush called the underlying credential model "fundamentally flawed" and said reliance on Classic PATs is a "severe liability." Cycode's recommendations for enterprises:

  • Bind credentials to destinations, not functions; apply headers conditionally based on validated target hosts, "not unconditionally stapled by a wrapper function"
  • Audit every internal tool that handles maintainer credentials
  • Treat all user inputs as hostile and validate hosts before credentials attach
  • Deprecate classic PATs

"The blast radius of a leaked token must be limited to one repository and the bare minimum permissions," Harush said. "A leaked token should never mean a leaked corporate identity."

What does this change for CISOs?

Dickson's advice is blunt: inventory every script and bot that holds a token, and ask what that key could do in the wrong hands and where it's allowed to go. Replace broad, long-lived tokens with narrow, short-lived ones bound to specific services — exactly how Microsoft fixed this. And stop trusting public registries blindly.

Internal tools, bots and automation get production-level keys and hobby-level review, he noted. Review your automations the way you review your people.

"A script that runs in a loop around the clock with a moderator's keys is, in effect, a moderator who never sleeps and never questions anything," Dickson said. WinGet's moderators, Harush added, were doing exactly what was asked of them — automating a flood of community submissions. But automation doesn't just remove the human who would have clicked the malicious link. It removes the one who would have noticed the anomaly.

via infoworld.com/feed/ (Source)

Filed under

  • software-supply-chain
  • microsoft-winget
  • github-access-tokens
  • credential-security
  • zero-click-vulnerability
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