TRAI recommends India-based control for satellite providers

By Amara Osei

On November 5, 2026, India’s Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) recommended a framework for Satellite Communication Network (SCN) provider authorisation and spectrum assignment that would keep core network-control facilities in India. The proposal would also require real-time traffic monitoring and give the Central Government a review role over every satellite gateway before establishment.

Under the proposed new authorisation category, SCN providers would supply network capacity to eligible telecom service providers rather than serve end users directly. That division separates network infrastructure from the authorised telecommunications relationship.

TRAI’s recommendations state that providers must “submit the location and technical details of each satellite earth station gateway” to the Central Government or a designated agency before establishing it. The government or agency could examine those details and direct the provider to take specific actions.

Who would the new SCN category serve?

TRAI’s model places eligible telecom service providers in the authorised relationship with users, while SCN providers remain responsible for the satellite network and its technical obligations. Each provider must ensure that its network delivers only telecommunications services for which the partnering entity holds authorisation.

That restriction creates an enforcement chain: providers cannot use their networks to offer a service outside the partner’s permission. SCN providers must also prevent unauthorised activity, including surveillance and electronic warfare, or use that could prejudice India’s sovereignty and security. The security conditions extend to satellite networks used for cross-border services.

Takeaway: SCN providers would carry the technical compliance burden rather than simply sell unused satellite capacity.

Where must network control sit?

TRAI would locate the operation, maintenance and control facilities for each SCN provider’s satellite communication network in India. The recommendation says the requirement also covers user terminals belonging to partnering authorised entities that connect to the provider’s network.

The rule therefore reaches beyond a provider’s own control centre to connected terminals handled through the authorised partner relationship. No overseas location would replace the India-based control requirement.

Takeaway: A satellite provider operating under the Indian framework would have to keep its network-control infrastructure in India.

How would unregistered terminal use be reported?

SCN providers would have to report to the Central Government any attempt to access or use their satellite networks through a user terminal not registered with the partnering entity. Each report must identify the terminal and its location.

To perform that duty, providers would need technical measures that identify and report such attempts. TRAI did not prescribe a specific technology, protocol or authentication mechanism. Providers would therefore determine the detection method while remaining responsible for producing the required report.

Takeaway: The rule sets a mandatory disclosure obligation, not a mandated detection technology.

What oversight would gateways face?

Before establishment, the location and technical details of each satellite earth station gateway would go to the Central Government or a designated agency. That authority could examine the submission and instruct the provider to take specific actions concerning the gateway’s establishment.

Providers would also furnish information, conduct interference-monitoring tests and implement mitigation measures when directed by the government. The government could require those tests and specify the operational measures providers must take to reduce interference.

Separately, TRAI would require SCN providers to offer a real-time traffic monitoring facility for compliance with rules governing Indian user traffic. The operating restrictions cover routing traffic through foreign gateways and mirroring Indian traffic to foreign satellite or telecom networks. Together, these provisions place both infrastructure review and live traffic oversight around the service.

Takeaway: Authorities would know where each gateway sits before deployment and retain continuing control over monitoring and interference.

Can terminals communicate directly through satellites?

No under the proposed architecture for terminals connected with a partnering authorised entity. Such terminals must not communicate directly through satellites without routing through a satellite earth station gateway.

TRAI would place the matching duty on SCN providers: they must “prevent direct communication between two or more user terminals through one or more satellites unless the traffic passes through a satellite earth station gateway.” The provider must also remain available for government-requested interference tests and carry out all necessary mitigation measures ordered by the government.

Takeaway: Gateway routing would be the default path for covered satellite traffic, with direct terminal-to-terminal links excluded.