US intelligence memo claims Nvidia CEO was spied on via recruited executive

A US intelligence-based memo claims China's Ministry of State Security recruited technology executive Alice Huang to spy on Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, according to multiple reports.

The New York Times first reported the memo's existence. The paper had already reported that the Nvidia chief executive was a target of Chinese intelligence. The Financial Times followed with an additional claim from the same memo: Jensen Huang had a romantic relationship with Alice Huang.

That detail matters. It converts an intelligence-collection concern into a potential personal-leverage question. Neither report said what information, if any, changed hands.

Alice Huang is an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore-based company. Neither she nor Megaspeed has publicly responded to the claims in the reports reviewed so far.

What did Nvidia say?

An Nvidia spokesperson told the NYT that Jensen Huang's interactions with Alice Huang were "not usual" in the course of business — the exact framing was that they were "not unusual" — and that the company does not share classified information with its customers.

That is a narrow denial. It addresses classified data and the ordinariness of the contacts. It does not address the alleged MSS recruitment, the reported relationship, or any non-classified commercial information at stake. No date, location, or scale figures appear in the memo's public descriptions.

The spokesperson added that Nvidia sells "the first, best and most of our technology in America." The statement reads as a policy defense rather than a direct rebuttal of the memo's claims.

What is the New Matrix connection?

A separate NYT report examined New Matrix, a Chinese company authorized by the US Commerce Department to buy advanced Nvidia chips.

Reporters visited the office address listed by New Matrix. They found, in the paper's words, "a hollow gray shell." No staff, no operations, no sign of a functioning business.

That finding raises a specific compliance question: how did a company with no visible physical presence pass vetting to purchase advanced US-export-controlled chips? The report notes concerns that New Matrix could be a front for a blacklisted private equity firm. If accurate, export-approved hardware could be flowing toward an entity the US government had already sanctioned.

The NYT did not specify how many chips New Matrix was authorized to buy, over what period, or whether any shipments were delivered. Those gaps will define whether this is a paperwork lapse or a diverted-hardware case.

Why does this matter for enterprise buyers?

Two threads run through the coverage. One targets Nvidia's chief executive personally. The other targets the export-control regime that decides who may buy Nvidia's most advanced silicon.

For enterprises, the stakes are supply-chain assurance. Nvidia hardware sits in data centers across every major Western economy, and any proven leakage of advanced chips to blacklisted buyers would tighten export rules further — restricting availability and raising compliance costs for legitimate purchasers.

The claims remain unverified in public. The memo's full text has not been released, its intelligence sourcing is described only in general terms, and no US agency has confirmed the reporting on the record. Nvidia's denial, the Commerce Department's authorization decision, and the hollow office each leave questions the reporting does not yet answer.