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Operation ShadowCloud: Backdoors Hide C2 in GitHub, SharePoint and Ably

Kaspersky uncovers Operation ShadowCloud: two new backdoors routing C2 through GitHub, SharePoint and Ably, hitting government networks in Asia and Africa since at least 2024.

Operation ShadowCloud: cloud service–based backdoors targeting government networks in Asia and Africa. Part 1
FeedOperation ShadowCloud: cloud service–based backdoors targeting government networks in Asia and Africa. Part 1 — sasint / pixabay

Event log

  1. Operation ShadowCloud, identified in early 2026, targets government networks in Asia and Africa using two new backdoors, GraphDoor and GitDoor.
  2. The attackers abused the legitimate MeshAgent utility and hid C2 traffic behind Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub and Ably cloud services.
  3. GitDoor uses GitHub repositories as C2: nine attacker-controlled profiles found, with the earliest created September 3, 2024.
  4. The toolset includes a renamed Mimikatz build (imzimzgo 2.2.0 x64), CookieKatz browser-cookie theft, PetitPotam NTLM coercion and a WhatsApp key extractor.
  5. Initial access was observed at a Taiwanese organization via MeshCentral Agent instances hard-coded to reach 27.102.66.162.

In early 2026, researchers at Kaspersky's Securelist team identified an active intrusion campaign — Operation ShadowCloud — that abuses the legitimate MeshAgent remote-access utility to drop two previously undocumented backdoors, named GraphDoor and GitDoor, onto government networks in Asia and Africa. What makes the campaign hard to catch is the traffic: command-and-control communications hide behind Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub and the Ably messaging cloud, blending in with ordinary corporate traffic and defeating network-based detection.

The researchers said the campaign's GitHub infrastructure shows the operation has been in preparation since at least the end of 2024, with nine attacker-controlled GitHub profiles created between September 3, 2024 and December 5, 2025.

How does the intrusion start?

The initial foothold observed involved two instances of the MeshCentral Agent (MD5 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d8d35b) inside a Taiwanese organization, hard-coded to reach a server at wss://27.102.66.162:443/agent.ashx. The exact entry point remains unknown, but evidence points to the reuse of a prior infection already present on the network.

Once the session was live, the attackers dropped three items per endpoint: a legitimate binary for DLL sideloading, a malicious loader DLL, and an encrypted payload file. Side-loaded binaries included OpenJDK's javaw.exe, Sandboxie Start, a Python application and Sysinternals ZoomIt — the latter started as a Windows service.

Two loader families handle decryption. Type 1 uses a hybrid RC4-plus-XOR scheme and abuses Windows RtlEthernetAddressToStringA APIs to smuggle backdoor bytes through MAC-address string conversions. Type 2 (internally SbieDll_st.dll) uses plain XOR, installs a vectored exception handler, clears hardware breakpoints via the CONTEXT.DR7 register, and switches between native and standard Windows APIs depending on OS version.

What does GitDoor actually do?

GitDoor (MD5 552f0a9cc5fc3755721fa49be05e8035) turns GitHub into a full C2 channel. It opens issues in an upload repository, tags victims with random eight-character identifiers, uploads system information via PUT requests, and pulls command files from a public download repository — all using a spoofed Chrome 122 User-Agent and a GitHub personal access token. Results are AES-256-ECB encrypted, XOR'd with the filename and pushed back to GitHub or Ably.

The command set is broad:

  • File manager: create, scan, delete, upload and download files in C2-delivered chunks
  • Keylogger: start/stop/status, with persistence via %APPDATA%\log.lock
  • Proxy and Ably proxy: SOCKS5-style relays configured through shared memory segments
  • Shellcode loader: pulls Base64-encoded COFF objects and injects them into memory

Behind those commands sits an extensive custom shellcode library delivered mostly as COFF binaries. It covers process injection (CreateRemoteThread, APC injection, KernelCallbackTable hijacking), Windows service and scheduled-task manipulation, registry and filesystem tooling, a WinPTY-based interactive reverse shell, and user-account creation via NetUserAdd. Credential theft is well represented: a Mimikatz build renamed "imzimzgo 2.2.0 x64" runs sekurlsa::logonpasswords and lsadump::sam; CookieKatz dumps cookies from Chrome, Edge and Msedgewebview2 memory; a WhatsAppKey module extracts the WhatsApp database decryption key. A PetitPotam implementation abuses EFSRPC to force NTLM authentication to attacker-controlled targets, and a Fileupload module exfiltrates data to upload.gofile.io.

What should defenders do now?

The practical takeaway is that standard egress filtering won't flag this traffic — GitHub API calls and Ably REST traffic look legitimate. Kaspersky has published a full indicator list: MeshAgent C2 address 27.102.66.162, hashes for both loaders, GitDoor and GraphDoor samples, plus the nine GitHub profiles. Sophos had previously touched on a fragment of the campaign in its own brief on modified Meterpreter shells.

Part 2 of the research will cover the GraphDoor backdoor, its plug-in suite — keylogging, process listing, screen capture, a modified Erfrp proxy and an Ably channel proxy — and attribution evidence the researchers say links the operation to Chinese-speaking threat groups.

For now, the cheapest defensive move is behavioral: watch for GitHub API tokens on endpoints that have no development role, and treat MeshCentral deployments you didn't install as an incident, not a misconfiguration.

via securelist.com (Source)

Filed under

  • command-and-control
  • backdoors
  • meshcentral
  • github
  • threat-intelligence
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