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Operation ShadowCloud: GraphDoor Backdoor Uses SharePoint, Graph API as C2 Channel

GraphDoor backdoor hides C2 traffic in Microsoft Graph API calls to SharePoint, deploying keylogger, screenshot and SOCKS5 proxy plug-ins against government networks in Asia and Africa.

Operation ShadowCloud: cloud service–based backdoors targeting government networks in Asia and Africa. Part 2
FeedOperation ShadowCloud: cloud service–based backdoors targeting government networks in Asia and Africa. Part 2 — madartzgraphics / pixabay

Event log

  1. GraphDoor (MD5 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952) uses SharePoint and the Microsoft Graph API as its command-and-control channel.
  2. Kaspersky links the operation to Chinese-speaking groups FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle through staging directories created within one-day windows in March and May 2026.
  3. The toolkit includes keylogger, screenshot, process-listing and Ably-based SOCKS5 proxy plug-ins, some built from the open-source Erfrp project.
  4. More than 20 proxy C2 servers across 12 ASNs support the operation; two domains also served Cobalt Strike beacons.

The GraphDoor backdoor in Operation ShadowCloud turns Microsoft SharePoint and the Microsoft Graph API into a full command-and-control channel, Kaspersky researchers disclosed in the second part of their analysis of the campaign against government networks in Asia and Africa. The implant, tracked by hash 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952, exfiltrates victim data, downloads keylogging and screenshot plug-ins, and receives operator commands entirely through API calls that are indistinguishable from ordinary enterprise cloud traffic.

How does GraphDoor communicate?

The malware opens a named pipe derived from its own process ID (\.\pipe\p%lu) and reuses it for plug-in status reports. It creates a staging directory at C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log<random-GUID> (GUID, a globally unique identifier).

To harvest host data covertly, the backdoor resolves Windows APIs at runtime using DJB2 name hashing and invokes them through a vectored exception handler (a Windows mechanism that intercepts crashes). Collected data includes:

  • Network adapter details and OS version
  • Public and private IP addresses, username, host name
  • A machine GUID and the backdoor's own PID
  • A full list of running processes

The bundle is AES-encrypted, Base64-encoded and sent to the C2 infrastructure.

What happens on Microsoft's cloud?

The malware first opens a TLS connection to login.microsoftonline.com on port 443. It decrypts three hard-coded AES-encrypted strings — a UUID path segment, a client ID and a client secret — and authenticates as an application, not a user, via an OAuth2 client-credentials POST. The returned access token authorizes subsequent calls to the Microsoft Graph API.

GraphDoor then issues a Graph PUT request that creates a file named main.%victim-unique-code%.js.map, masquerading as a JavaScript source map, in a SharePoint document library on the site buildersemp[.]sharepoint[.]com. The eight-character alphanumeric code identifies the victim. The request body contains the encrypted reconnaissance data under the JSON label "commit from INSOMNIA".

The backdoor pulls three plug-in modules from a SharePoint list via Graph GET requests: scr.ts (screenshots), pr.ts (process listing) and kl.ts (keylogger). Each plug-in downloads in a separate thread. The keylogger downloads only if the file C:\Users\analyst\AppData\Roaming\log.lock exists.

Command retrieval queries another SharePoint list for files titled main.%unique_victim_code% with allowed extensions .js, .swp, .tmp, .kmap, .pmap and .apmap. Two shellcode commands extend the GitDoor set: shell, which runs cmd.exe /C strings, and adsmload, which decodes payloads formatted as ASCII MAC addresses and injects them into memory.

What do the plug-ins do?

Each plug-in is a loader stub plus a COFF object (Common Object File Format); the stub locates a marker byte sequence, relocates the code, and calls an entry function named go.

  • Keylogger (kl.ts). Writes XOR-encrypted keystrokes and mouse events to %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat. A random 32-byte XOR key is itself XOR-masked with a hard-coded key and preceded by a fixed 32-byte marker. Low-level keyboard and mouse hooks capture virtual key codes, window titles, UTC timestamps and mouse events (MLD, MLU, MRD, MRU, MMD, MMU, MWH).
  • Process listing (pr.ts). Acquires SeDebugPrivilege and records process ID, parent ID, executable name, architecture, session ID and domain\user for every process, then writes the results to the backdoor's named pipe.
  • Screenshot (scr.ts). Captures JPEG snapshots of windows matching a supplied process ID, or the whole desktop if the ID is zero, and pipes them out as Base64.
  • Move directory (moveDir.ts). Relocates the legitimate executable, the loader DLL (from a list including python311.dll, winmm.dll, version.dll, SbieDll.dll and others) and the encrypted config.ini, then launches the executable from the new path and terminates the old instance via the Global\ExitEvent event.
  • Proxy channel (channel.ts). Reflectively injects a patched build of the open-source Erfrp reverse proxy (MD5: d89b2fe0759df2d534e7a728700a6f8c) that reads its configuration from a shared-memory segment instead of a file. A path string, C:/Users/user/Desktop/pythonrat/proxytest/Erfrp-0.1/frpc.go, leaks the attacker's development environment.
  • Ably channels (abchannel.ts, ab2channel.ts). Two Go binaries use Ably's real-time messaging service, one as a TCP relay over JSON events split on a ###!!### delimiter, the other (MD5: b4956b230d296cb4b015b42b11d80e32) as a covert SOCKS5 proxy tunneled through Ably's Pusher-compatible WebSocket endpoint, chunking traffic into 33,792-byte blocks across private request and response channels.

Who is behind it?

Attribution remains unconfirmed. Kaspersky reports overlaps with the Chinese-speaking groups FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle. On several victims, implants from those groups appeared in the same staging directories within a one-day window of GitDoor deployment.

In one case, FamousSparrow executed excint.exe, a renamed Avast Antivirus component (MD5: 86a46af43e18288e1df439b2a9a6f7ca) that side-loaded a malicious wtsapi32.dll (MD5: 733f8002aa9531b25384c0014d15cc1f) on 2026.03.06; GitDoor files appeared in the same directory on 2026.03.05. The payload used the RC4 key iotrh^%4CFGTj, previously tied to FamousSparrow. In a second case, CopperTurtle's pdfset.exe, injecting PLEAD RAT, landed on 2026.05.03, one day before GitDoor files.

The backdoor embeds no hard-coded C2 domain. It receives C2 details through proxy or Ably channels. Domains ms[.]twnic[.]top and ekmt[.]tw, resolving to 103[.]106]230[.]33 and 123[.]58[.]205[.]105, doubled as Cobalt Strike beacon servers on GraphDoor victims. Kaspersky listed more than 20 proxy C2 addresses across 12 ASNs, including RouterHosting (AS 14956), EXTRAVM (AS 53724) and Tencent (AS 132203).

Indicators of compromise include the GraphDoor hash, two SharePoint sites (buildersemp[.]sharepoint[.]com, cskautogo[.]sharepoint[.]com) and both Cobalt Strike domains. Kaspersky advised treating unsolicited deployments of the MeshCentral Agent as suspicious, noting the tool has been abused by multiple threat actors globally.

via securelist.com (Source)

Filed under

  • graphdoor
  • operation-shadowcloud
  • sharepoint
  • microsoft-graph-api
  • command-and-control
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