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Optimizely confirms supply-chain attack hitting 178 customer sites

Attackers from China exploited an Optimizely signup flaw to inject stealer malware into 178 sites including HSBC, Costco and Zoom — and the vendor's fix claims face scrutiny.

Optimizely confirms massive cyberattack on customer websites injected stealer malware
FeedOptimizely confirms massive cyberattack on customer websites injected stealer malware — geralt / pixabay

Event log

  1. At least 178 websites were confirmed infected with malware injected via Optimizely's CDN.
  2. Victims include HSBC, Costco, Starbucks, Zoom, Equifax and Salesforce; Salesforce disabled Optimizely scripts as a precaution.
  3. The malware skimmed card data, swapped crypto wallet addresses and delivered Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits.
  4. Analyst Frank Dickson found a 3.5-hour discrepancy between Optimizely's timeline and the researcher's observations.
  5. At HSBC, a content security policy blocked the main payload, but a backup copy ran via the 'unsafe-eval' setting.

By Daniel Okafor

At least 178 websites ran attacker code served from Optimizely's own CDN, the vendor has confirmed. UK researcher Scott Helme, founder of Report URI, documented the infections in a report published Monday. He says the real count could be higher. That number covers only what his team directly observed.

Victims include Zoom, Paychex, Equifax, GitLab, Starbucks, IKEA, Mattel, American Eagle, Air France, Mutual of Omaha, Heineken, Home Chef, Cinnabon, Levi's, Costco, HSBC and the BBC. Salesforce confirmed it was hit too. "Salesforce is investigating unauthorized modifications to scripts provided by Optimizely and used on certain Salesforce websites," the company said in an emailed statement. "As a precaution, Salesforce is confirming that Optimizely scripts are disabled across preview and production instances."

How did the attackers get in?

They abused a capability in Optimizely's Web Experimentation product that lets users add members to a site's development team, according to Helme. Optimizely's own account, emailed to customers and posted to its status page, describes it differently: attackers "exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow. They used it to impersonate a user and add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects."

The mechanics matter for anyone running third-party scripts. Customers load an Optimizely JavaScript snippet from the vendor's CDN. That snippet carries Optimizely code, the customer's A/B tests, and an optional Project JavaScript field for custom code. The attackers injected their payload into Project JavaScript and touched nothing else.

"The file was still served from cdn.Optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate, from a host that every affected site already trusted," the report notes. In other words, no victim site had its own code or infrastructure breached.

What did the malware steal?

Helme's report describes a multi-purpose kit. It:

  • Swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's
  • Skimmed payment cards
  • Stole cookies and screenshots
  • Delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits on iPhones and iPads

The card skimmer had clear limits. "The script watches form submissions and every fetch/XHR POST for a card number, expiry date and CVV," the report says. "When it has all three, it sends them" to an attacker domain via navigator.sendBeacon. Cards entered into hosted payment iframes such as Stripe or Adyen were out of reach. Cards typed into a site's own form fields were not.

Is the fix actually a fix?

Optimizely says yes, in unusually absolute language. The company claims it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset affected accounts, removed injected code and blocked delivery via Cloudflare. It states the platform is "fully secured" and that "modification of Javascript no longer possible."

Frank Dickson, principal analyst at Dickson Research, challenges both the claim and the timeline. Optimizely puts the first malicious write at 07:51. Report URI saw the BBC's snippet loading attacker code at 04:21 — three and a half hours earlier.

"The forensics report should reconcile that gap," Dickson said. "Customers need the real start time to scope their exposure." He added: "Optimizely seems very comfortable stating absolutes early in a forensics investigation. Those are verdicts from a company whose forensics are still underway and whose timeline disagrees with outside research."

Helme cannot verify the fix either. Some infected sites were cleaned. He must wait to see whether they get reinfected before concluding the original hole is closed.

Who did it, and what should customers do now?

Helme believes a small group of thieves, almost certainly operating from China, is responsible. He cites extensive Chinese writing in the code and infrastructure previously used by other Chinese actors. "They are either Chinese or they really want us to think that they are Chinese," he said. He rules out state actors; they would likely have weaponized major news sites to plant false stories rather than steal cards.

Dickson flagged one more problem: Optimizely's documentation tells customers to allow 'unsafe-eval' in their content security policy. At HSBC, that policy blocked the main payload and the data theft, but a backup copy of the malicious code ran anyway through that setting.

"A vendor's setup guide should not quietly loosen its customers' defenses," Dickson said. His recommendations: restrict script-src to hosts a page actually needs, lock down connect-src so stolen data has nowhere to go, drop unsafe-eval wherever possible, and start in report-only mode so nothing breaks.

"The Optimizely attack may be about as bad as a third-party script compromise gets," he said. "Optimizely owes its customers a clear explanation of how one flaw reached so many unrelated companies." That explanation has not arrived. Optimizely did not respond to an interview request.

via cio.com/feed/ (Source)

Filed under

  • supply-chain-attack
  • optimizely
  • malicious-javascript
  • cdn-security
  • data-theft
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