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Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Pushed Malware to 178 Enterprise Sites
Attackers poisoned 188 Optimizely scripts across 178 orgs, hitting Zoom, BBC and Salesforce with card skimmers, crypto hijackers and iOS exploit kits.
Event log
- 188 Optimizely JavaScript files across 178 organizations were infected with malware
- Wallets tied to the attack received roughly $7,000 on November 16, including 0.08298 BTC
- Malware capabilities included card skimming, crypto clipboard hijacking and Coruna/DarkSword iOS exploit kits
- By 21:52 UTC on November 16, cleanup had reduced infected files from 188 to one
- The initial access vector at Optimizely remains unknown
A supply chain attack on Optimizely compromised 188 JavaScript files belonging to 178 organizations, pushing malware onto the websites of Zoom, CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce and GitLab, among others. Security researcher Scott Helme disclosed the findings on Monday after his team analyzed 1,611 scripts used by the platform.
Optimizely sells digital experience and experimentation tooling: customers load its JavaScript files into their own webpages to run A/B testing and personalization. That architecture is what made the incident efficient for attackers. By inserting malicious code into Optimizely customer projects, they caused files hosted on the company's content delivery network to deliver malware to every visitor of an affected site — no direct compromise of those sites required.
The takeaway: a single vendor-side compromise multiplied instantly across nearly two hundred enterprise web properties.
What did the malware actually do?
BleepingComputer independently confirmed via urlscan.io scans that the malicious script loaded, or attempted to load, on Zoom, KLM, GitLab, BBC, Scheels, CNN, American Girl, ManageBuilding, Smartsheet, Stamps.com and Salesforce. Fox News, Mutual of Omaha, American Eagle, Air Force-affiliated Air France, Change.org, HSBC Insurance, Bitly, IG, UNICEF USA and Optimizely itself were also affected.
Analysis of the modified files showed the injected code pulled a second-stage payload from https://1688360[.]cc/track.js. Some files referenced the URL directly; others hid it behind Base64 encoding decoded with JavaScript's atob() function. Helme also found a variant carrying an embedded copy of the payload that executes if the remote script is blocked — a fallback that keeps the attack alive when network filters intervene.
According to Helme's investigation, track.js carried three main capabilities:
- Cryptocurrency hijacking: monitors pages for wallet addresses and swaps in attacker-controlled ones, redirecting transfers.
- Payment card skimming: captures card numbers, expiration dates and security codes entered on pages and sends them to https://1688360[.]cc/card.php.
- iOS exploit delivery: loads additional JavaScript targeting iPhones and iPads, identified by Helme as the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, each aimed at different iOS versions.
The script also collects browser cookies, visited URLs and screenshots for transmission to the attackers.
The plain version: this was credential theft, card theft and device exploitation bundled into one file served from a trusted CDN.
How much was stolen?
The cryptocurrency wallets embedded in track.js received roughly $7,000 in transactions on November 16 — evidence that the clipboard-hijacking component worked. BleepingComputer catalogued ten wallet addresses across Bitcoin, Litecoin, TRON, Ethereum, BNB Smart Chain, Solana, TON, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin.
The largest single wallet, a Bitcoin address, took in 0.08298 BTC (about $5,380) across seven transactions. A TRON address logged the most activity: 50 transactions totaling 662.9 USDT plus 184 TRX, roughly $719. The Solana, TON, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin addresses had received nothing at the time of analysis — attacker infrastructure waiting for victims.
Seven thousand dollars is a modest haul for an operation that touched sites serving millions of daily visitors; the card-skimming and data-collection components may represent the larger, unmeasured loss.
What happens now?
Cleanup moved fast. By 21:52 UTC on November 16, only one of the 188 compromised files still contained malicious code, according to Helme.
The open question is the initial access vector. Helme traced the earliest script hijacking to the early morning of November 16, but it remains unclear how attackers modified so many separate customer projects. A compromise of Optimizely's own infrastructure, stolen credentials and other access methods all remain on the table. Optimizely has not yet responded to a request for comment.
For enterprises running third-party scripts, the lesson is that vendor trust is attack surface.
via bleepingcomputer.com (Source)
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Cross-references
- Optimizely Script Compromise Hit 178 Firms' Sites Without Breaching Them
- Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Hit CNN, BBC, Salesforce Sites
- Optimizely confirms supply-chain attack hitting 178 customer sites
- Optimizely breach hit 178 organisations with card-skimming code
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