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FAA Ground Stop Exposes a 70%-Complete Network Still on Old Copper

The FAA's November 13 ground stop lasted 4 hours 21 minutes, hit 17 of 22 en route centers, and exposed an aging copper network awaiting full fiber completion in 2027.

One Router, a Nationwide Ground Stop: The FAA’s Tech Debt Comes Due
FeedOne Router, a Nationwide Ground Stop: The FAA’s Tech Debt Comes Due — 16301694 / pixabay

Event log

  1. November 13: The FAA ordered its third national ground stop, lasting from 3:54 to 8:15 p.m. ET.
  2. A router generated 1,000 connections every four to five seconds, destabilizing 17 of 22 en route centers.
  3. As of November 2, 2026, the FAA reported the fiber conversion at 70% complete, with 5,170 fiber connections.
  4. L3Harris expects the conversion to finish in 2027; the FAA has released no public root-cause report.
  5. Congress approved $12.5 billion in July 2025; Duffy's request later rose from $30 billion to $50 billion.

A four-hour, 21-minute FAA ground stop on November 13 was the third national ground stop in U.S. history. The order took effect at 3:54 p.m. ET and ended at 8:15 p.m. ET.

What triggered the ground stop?

Routine work at a remote FAA site involved a copper-to-fiber cutover on the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI). A router installed during the switch began flooding other routers with 1,000 connection attempts every four to five seconds.

Instability reached 17 of 22 en route centers and disrupted voice and radar, while officials ruled out cyber or artificial intelligence involvement in the incident. No technologist who had tracked the remaining copper lines considered the outcome surprising.

How complete is the fiber conversion?

The FAA team reported the conversion at 70% of sites complete as of November 2, 2026. The network still carried Cisco 600-series routers built between 2001 and 2006, equipment Cisco had already retired. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said the copper itself was so old that it was being discontinued.

The system connects more than 4,400 facilities and manages more than 29,000 services. The FAA also reported 5,170 fiber connections. Yet those figures are not cross-referenced.

The disclosure leaves two material gaps: it does not show how many critical circuits still run across the unfinished third, or how many of the 5,170 planned fiber connections actually carry traffic. The FAA accepted similar progress markers for years, while Congress funded modernization in partial increments that stretched the cutover schedule into 2027.

FAA oversight, congressional funding choices and contractor execution all shaped the exposure. The cutover exposed poor system-level choices, although the official investigation has not assigned final fault. The November 13 cutover showed the operational cost of leaving that residual risk in service.

What remains under investigation?

At the November 14 Department of Transportation briefing, Duffy identified three possible causes still under investigation: user error, installer error, or contractor-installed faulty routers.

FAA Acting Chief Technology Officer Rebecca Guy said at the same briefing: “We saw two places that were actually pinging our network at a very high rate: 1,000 connections every 4 to 5 seconds.” She disabled both immediately and stabilized the network.

The 1,000-connection flood is not normal operation. It can accompany a misconfiguration, a device stuck in a retry loop, or faulty hardware during a cutover. Old unsupported equipment makes the flood more likely and harder to contain once it begins. No public root-cause report has established which explanation applies.

Was this failure unprecedented?

Not according to the FAA’s own record. A strikingly similar event in November 2009 involved an engineer misconfiguring a temporary router during another transition; the OIG documented the five-hour disruption and a failed alert tool.

GAO’s 2012 and 2013 reports flagged chronic modernization delays and rising maintenance burdens on aging systems. By 2024, an FAA assessment classified 51 of 138 air traffic control systems as unsustainable and another 54 as potentially unsustainable, and identified 58 as critical to national airspace safety and efficiency.

The risk was therefore documented before the latest cutover and was not fully addressed.

When will the replacement arrive?

FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said on November 14 that the system “will continue to break until we replace it.”

The fiber conversion remains roughly 70% complete, and L3Harris expects to finish the work in 2027, leaving the FAA dependent on the existing network throughout the transition. AT&T, Verizon and Lumen are working with the FAA on a replacement for FTI, but the current setup remains in service until the new system is built.

Network maintenance runs on paper logs, Bedford said. Officials had to dig through those records to learn who was working where after the routers began flooding the system. The FAA has released no public root-cause report, and the residual sites continue using the same technology that produced the ground stop.

What has Congress funded?

Congress approved $12.5 billion in July 2025, which Duffy characterized as a partial payment toward a $30 billion request, an amount equal to less than half his original target. He has since raised the request to $50 billion, a $20 billion increase.

The disclosed record gives no dollar estimate for the outage’s economic cost. Investigation into the three possibilities Duffy listed continues, and no final cause has been assigned.

What warning does the outage provide?

GAO has already identified comparable systems with unresolved modernization risk across other federal closed networks.

  • A 60-year-old Department of War system has no modernization plan.
  • Neither does a 25-year-old Department of Energy system.
  • Even the FAA’s parent department was flagged: a 31-year-old DOT system whose modernization plan does not describe the work needed to complete it.

Those systems remain unnamed in the disclosed findings, which limits comparison. The FAA case shows how one local cutover error in a closed network can become a system-wide interruption, exposing the limits of completion metrics that hide residual circuits and active-link gaps.

For operators of closed infrastructure networks, deferred modernization shortens mean time between failures. The open operational question is where and when the next local cutover becomes a system-wide interruption.

via news.clearancejobs.com (Source)

Filed under

  • faa
  • network-modernization
  • critical-infrastructure
  • fiber-optic-networks
  • aviation-it
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