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Retadup Worm Resurfaces as CoffeeLoader Delivery Channel
Kaspersky found a new CoffeeLoader variant spreading through the Retadup USB worm, a botnet dismantled in 2019 after 850,000 machines were disinfected. Roughly 15,000 systems have been hit this year.

Event log
- New CoffeeLoader variant detected August 2026, spread via the Retadup USB worm first seen in 2017.
- Retadup's botnet was taken down in 2019; French law enforcement disinfected over 850,000 machines.
- About 15,000 systems blocked Retadup infection attempts in the first three quarters of 2026.
- The Armoury packer now decrypts payloads via OpenGL instead of OpenCL GPU compute.
- Retadup C2 domains were re-registered starting 2024; CoffeeLoader delivery began in early 2025.
By Daniel Okafor
Kaspersky detected a new CoffeeLoader variant in the wild in August 2026, and the delivery chain is the real story: the malware arrives through Retadup, a USB worm whose botnet French police reportedly dismantled in 2019 after disinfecting more than 850,000 machines. Roughly 15,000 systems have blocked Retadup infection attempts in the first three quarters of this year, most of them in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia. That is a fraction of the 2019 scale — roughly one disinfected machine in fifty-seven back then. But the infrastructure works, and nobody knows who is running it.
What does the infection chain look like?
The initial dropper is an NSIS-based installer. On launch, it drops a file named 7z.dll into a temporary directory and executes it through rundll32.exe. The file is a patched copy of the legitimate 7-Zip archiver library, with part of its code replaced by self-decrypting shellcode. That shellcode is a new version of the Armoury packer, previously documented in connection with CoffeeLoader.
The old Armoury variant decrypted its payload on the GPU using OpenCL. The new variant still uses the GPU but switches to OpenGL compute shaders. The kernel performs a simple XOR of data against a key buffer.
The payload structure has also changed. The old packer delivered a DLL containing two shellcode fragments — a dropper that copied the library into Windows folders and added it to autorun, and a stager that injected CoffeeLoader into a fresh dllhost.exe process. The new version delivers a third stage: a dedicated CoffeeLoader downloader.
How does the downloader persist?
The Trojan copies 7z.dll into an eight-hexadecimal-digit subfolder of %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%. The folder, library and Run registry value names derive from system volume information, so they differ per machine. It also writes a StartupApproved\Run registry value that blocks users from disabling autorun through Task Manager.
The downloader then injects into one of several processes — dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe — and pulls the main body from a hardcoded C2 over HTTPS, using the path /payload?md5=, with the hash of the previously downloaded payload on subsequent requests. The payload arrives as XOR-encrypted shellcode; the first 16 bytes serve as the key. Two custom headers, X-Signature and X-Content-MD5, let the Trojan verify the download against an embedded public key and an MD5 checksum before executing it.
What changed in the main module?
Not much. The attackers rotate request and response keys (A21251838432306F2CD2540593656B9E and 2026F751079659CF71C7BA64B345C12A) and replaced certificate validation with signature verification using a new public key. The protocol magic constant 0xC0FFEE42 — the source of the malware's name — is gone, replaced by the less telling 0xD1D57871. Kaspersky found no functional changes: the same three commands remain, letting the operator inject a payload into a process, save it as an executable and run it, or save it as a DLL and launch it via rundll32.exe.
Who revived the botnet?
Nobody knows. Retadup, first discovered in 2017, spread via USB drives using hidden files and LNK shortcuts, written in AutoIt and AutoHotkey. After the 2019 takedown, someone began re-registering its old C2 domains in 2024, initially serving SmokeLoader packed with 32-bit Armoury, then switching to CoffeeLoader in early 2025. The C2 protocol is plaintext commands encoded in Base64 and converted to hex — simple enough that the original author, or anyone else, could take over. Kaspersky notes that 2017-era Retadup samples still communicate with live C2 servers today.
What should defenders check?
Active Retadup C2 domains include alphanoob[.]com, newblackage[.]com, newminersage[.]com, radnewage[.]com, minernewage[.]com, rad2016.publicvm[.]com, radpal.publicvm[.]com and roro2016.linkpc[.]net. The CoffeeLoader C2 is internet-speed-check[.]com, with payload files hosted at rurjfvn[.]rs/update.exe and alphanoob[.]com/update.exe. Kaspersky published MD5 hashes for the DLLs and NSIS installers. Block the domains. Audit removable-media policy. The persistence mechanism relies on autorun registry keys most EDR platforms can flag — if anyone is looking.
via securelist.com (Source)
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